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In re Estate of Bethurem, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 92 (Nov. 27, 2013)1 
 
WILLS & ESTATES: UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined one issue: (1) whether, in the absence of a presumption of undue 
influence, a will contestant bears the burden of proving undue influence by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
 
Disposition 
 
 Yes, absent a presumption of undue influence, a will contestant bears the burden of 
proving undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Respondents Anita Herrera Perez (“Anita”) and Sandra Kurtz (“Sandra”) challenged the 
validity of their stepfather’s will, claiming undue influence from appellant, their Aunt Ines 
Careveo (“Ines”). In 2004, respondents’ stepfather, Arlan Bethurem (“Arlan”), executed a will 
bequeathing his estate to his wife Bertha. If Bertha did not survive him, Arlan’s will divided his 
estate equally between his three stepchildren and a granddaughter. In 2005, Bertha became ill 
and Arlan needed assistance with her care. Ines came from Texas to help care for Bertha. Ines 
asked Sandra and Anita to assist with Bertha’s care, but neither could do so. Ines was angry with 
Sandra and Anita for failing to care for Bertha. 
 Bertha passed away in May 2006. Ines helped Arlan to make funeral arrangements with a 
priest. The priest testified that Arlan was lucid at the meeting, but expressed disappointment in 
Sandra and Anita for not being more supportive during Bertha’s illness. After the funeral, Arlan 
spoke with Ines daily via telephone. However, Arlan did not speak with Sandra for several 
months or to Anita for more than a year. In the meantime, Arlan continued to go to work and to 
provide for his own daily needs. 
 In 2007, Arlan had his friend and accountant Vicki Preston (“Preston”) prepare a new 
will for him, which changed the beneficiaries to Ines and Arlan’s sister and disinherited his 
stepchildren. Preston testified that Arlan appeared in good mental condition. Further, Preston and 
her friend, who served as a witness to the will, testified that Arlan expressed disappointment that 
Sandra and Anita had not helped care for Bertha. Arlan also conveyed title of his home to 
himself and Ines as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Additionally, he added Ines to some 
of his bank accounts.  
 Arlan lost his job in October 2008. He put his house up for sale and moved to Oregon to 
be with Sandra. Arlan expressed regret to Sandra about changing his will. Sandra testified that 
Arlan had a history of changing his will when he was angry with family members. Arlan named 
Sandra and Ines as beneficiaries to a savings account worth $84,000. 
Two months later, Arlan committed suicide. Preston was appointed special administrator 
of Arlan’s estate. Because Arlan’s home was in escrow at the time, Ines received the sale 
proceeds. Ines and Sandra received equal shares of his $84,000 savings account. Preston 
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petitioned to distribute the rest of the according to the 2007 will. Sandra and Anita opposed the 
petition, claiming Ines had unduly influenced Arlan. 
The probate commissioner recommended that the 2004 will be admitted for probate, 
finding that Ines had unduly influenced Arlan “by mount[ing] a campaign to turn Bertha and 
Arlan against Bertha’s daughters.” Although the District Court found some of the probate 
commissioner’s assumptions unsupported by evidence, it reasoned these were harmless errors. 
Consequently, the District Court affirmed the probate commissioner’s recommendation. 
 
Discussion 
 
 To establish undue influence in Nevada, “it must appear, either directly or by justifiable 
inference from the facts proved, that the influence . . . destroy[ed] the free agency of the 
testator.”2 Further, “[a] presumption of undue influence arises when a fiduciary relationship 
exists and the fiduciary benefits from the questioned transaction.”3 However, undue influence 
may also be shown in the absence of a presumption.4 The appropriate burden and quantum of 
proof required to establish undue influence in the absence of a presumption is an issue of first 
impression for this Court. 
Burden and quantum of proof for establishing undue influence 
 A majority of other jurisdictions require undue influence be proved only by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Additionally, the Court has used a preponderance standard for 
proving undue influence in cases involving testamentary transfers. Consequently, “in the absence 
of a presumption, a will contestant must establish the existence of undue influence by a 
preponderance of the evidence.” To meet this standard, “the contestant must show that the 
disposition of property under the will was ‘more likely than not’ the result of undue influence.”5 
This approach provides the best protections to vulnerable alleged donors because it makes it 
easier for will contestants to establish undue influence. 
Substantial evidence did not support the district court’s order 
 Neither the probate court nor the district court identified the evidence that supported the 
probate commissioner’s finding of undue influence. “[T]he fact that Ines may have possessed 
influence does not amount to undue influence unless her influence destroyed Arlan’s free 
agency.” As there is no other evidence indicating Arlan changed his will due to any undue 
influence, the district court’s order affirming the probate court was not supported by substantial 
evidence.  
 
Conclusion 
  
The Court reversed the district court’s order invalidating the will as a product of undue 
influence because the respondents failed to meet the requisite burden of proof. 
                                                
2 In re Estate of Hegarty, 46 Nev 321, 326, 212 P. 1040, 1042 (1923).  
3 In re Jane Tiffany Living Trust 2001, 124 Nev. 74, 78 177 P.3d 1060, 1062 (2008).  
4 See generally Hegarty, 46 Nev. at 327, 212 P. at 1042. 
5 See Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 P.3d 493, 507 (Cal. 2001) (discussing the preponderance standard generally).  
